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By virtue of geographic, historical and cultural factors, Turkey 
and Russia’s foreign policies are characterised by a natural mul-
ti-regional projection stretching throughout the Eurasian land-
mass from the Western Balkans to the Central Asian steppes, 
where their interests, at different times, have collided, competed 
or converged. Over the post-bipolar era, such a multi-region-
al dimension has gained a decisive value for the rethinking of 
the role and the identity of Turkey and the Russian Federation 
in the contemporary international scenario. This trend is par-
ticularly significant since both actors – although to different 
degrees and benefiting from different resources of power and 
leverage – emerged from the bipolar system affected by “status 
panic”1, i.e. by the need to reaffirm their respective positions in 
a rapidly changing international environment. Indeed, while 
the Russian risk of demotion associated with the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union is self-explaining, no less compelling was 
the risk of strategic marginalisation faced by Turkey as a conse-
quence of the dissolution itself. 
Making the status panic even deeper has been the closely 
connected identity issue, rooted in Russia and Turkey’s ge-
ographic-civilisational location as well as in the legacy of the 
multinational empire experience, reawakened in both coun-
tries after decades of ostensible marginalisation resulting from 
the Cold War’s ideological orthodoxy. Indeed, to a large extent 
1 A. Sergunin, Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior. Theory and Practice, Verlag, 
Stuttgart, 2016, p. 27.
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Turkey’s Europeanness was defined according to its geostrate-
gic position2, since its anchorage to the Euro-Atlantic security 
mechanisms represented, throughout the Cold War era, both a 
manifestation and a confirmation of its Western and European 
credentials, as well as of the country’s attachment to Western 
sets of values. Therefore, in the post-Cold War environment, 
the risk of strategic marginalisation went hand in hand with 
a parallel risk of an identity crisis, exacerbated in the domes-
tic realm by the increasing socio-political challenges to the 
Kemalist-Republican dogma of Westernisation. In a different 
yet analogous way, the USSR’s dissolution traumatised Russia’s 
“cultural, political, and economic identity”3, thereby generat-
ing a vicious circle among the different layers of post-bipolar 
transition. Consistently with these trends, the post-bipolar re-
assessment of both countries’ foreign policy overlapped and in-
tertwined with the inextricable national identity knot, making 
the foreign policy-making process a highly symbolic ground for 
domestic confrontation, the more so since Turkey and Russia’s 
projection toward areas once hegemonised under imperial sway 
rarely came free of identity considerations and reverberations.
On this backdrop, regional policies provide a privileged per-
spective for analysing Ankara and Moscow’s post-bipolar for-
eign policy as well as for assessing the evolution, current state 
and nature of their bilateral relations. Moreover, the contempo-
rary international system is characterised by an increasing mis-
alignment and hierarchic reversal between global and regional 
dynamics. The global system’s high degree of penetration into 
the various regional systems – typical of the Cold War – is jam-
ming, causing the global distribution of power to be less and 
less important at the regional level4. The resulting regionalisa-
2 M. Müftüler-Baç, “Turkey’s predicament in the post-Cold War era”, Future, vol. 
28, no. 3, 1996, pp. 255. 
3 A. Tsygankov, “Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical thinking after 
the Soviet break-up”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 36, 2003, p. 104.
4 A. Colombo, “L’ordine globale e l’ascesa delle grandi potenze regionali”, 
Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali, no. 14, ISPI, 2011, pp. 4-11.
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tion of the international system and connected change in the 
scale of international relations provide the foreign policies of 
Russia and Turkey – as pivotal actors in multi-regional con-
texts – with a significance which transcends the mere bilateral 
interaction level to embrace the wider systematisation of the 
Eurasian chessboard.
Starting from the assumption that the objective and subjec-
tive components of the foreign policy-making process can only 
be artificially separated, the aim of this chapter is to highlight 
the roots and the tactical nature of the Turkish-Russian partner-
ship as it developed in response to the still ongoing process of 
redefining their respective positions in the post-bipolar system. 
Starting from the similarities in Turkey and Russia’s geopolitical 
features and strategic cultures, the article maintains that Ankara 
and Moscow came to develop analogous views of the risks and 
the opportunities resulting from the post-Cold War transition. 
Coupled with domestic enabling factors – such as economic 
growth and strong charismatic leaderships – these converging 
perceptions opened up margins for cooperation in the same re-
gional dimension where for centuries the two actors’ interests 
competed and collided. Therefore, despite being chiefly tactical 
in nature, the Russo-Turkish entente stands as a key pillar upon 
which both actors seem doomed to build respective post-bipo-
lar role and identity.
Background for the entente: common geopolitical 
factors and converging perceptions
Turkey and Russia share significant geopolitical features, both 
in physical and human terms. In particular, their characteris-
tic and almost unique geographic location in the heart of the 
Eurasian landmass and at the crossroads of multiple civilisations 
– coupled with a shared imperial experience and with a prob-
lematic post-imperial transition – generated analogous views 
of the international system and similar strategic cultures. Such 
analogies contribute to shedding light on both the evolution 
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and the scope of their bilateral relations, starting from their 
competition in the 1990s to the entente in the following decade.
A basic commonality in their respective strategic cultures lies 
in the chiefly military and territorial conception of national 
security, resulting from a sense of geographic insecurity with 
deep historical roots5. Throughout its existence as an empire, 
the struggle to stabilise porous frontiers lacking – especially on 
the Western front – natural borders has accompanied Russian 
foreign policy and presided over the militarisation of society, 
leaving a deep imprint on national strategic culture. Although 
benefiting from more defined external borders – at least in nat-
ural terms, and at least on three out of five fronts – Turkey tra-
ditionally shared the same perception of geographic insecurity, 
which, in turn, since imperial times resulted in an analogous 
tendency to securitise society6. 
5 The analysis of  Turkey’s geopolitical features and resulting strategic culture 
is mainly based upon: F. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus. The Foreign Policy of  
Turkey, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971; M. Mufti, Daring 
and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture. Republic at Sea, London and New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; P. Robins, Suits and Uniform: Turkish Foreign Policy since 
the Cold War, London, Hurst & Co., 2003; M. Aydin, “Securitization of  History 
and Geography: Understanding of  Security in Turkey”, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, 2003, pp. 163-184; A. Karaosmanoğlu, “The 
Evolution of  the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey”, Journal 
of  International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1, 2000, pp. 199-216.  As for Russia, the anal-
ysis is mainly drawn from: R. Legvold (Ed.), Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first 
century and the shadow of  the past, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007; B. 
Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, New 
York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002; T. Hopf, Social Construction of  International Politics: 
Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 and 1999,  Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
2002; J. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy. The Return of  Great Power Politics, Lanham, 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.
6 In Aydin’s view the sense of  geographical insecurity was mainly the result of  
the peculiar location of  the Anatolian Peninsula, a natural channel not only for 
migrations from the East, but also for invasions from both East and West. M. 
Aydin (2003), p. 170. 
The Russo-Turkish Entente: A Tactical Embrace 49
Thus, security concerns have traditionally been paramount in 
the devising of Russian and Turkish foreign policies, the more 
so since the sense of geographic insecurity has been aggravated 
by the perception of being surrounded by hostile neighbours, 
prone to take advantage of Turkey and Russia’s weaknesses to 
advance their own interests and agendas to the formers’ detri-
ment. From this perspective, the idea of Russia as a “fortress” 
encircled by a hostile Western siege – particularly strong during 
the Soviet era and revived in the post-bipolar one7 – closely 
resembles Turkey’s own insecurity complex as it developed in 
the difficult decades between the decline and successive collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the Republic, epito-
mised in the so-called Sèvres Syndrome8. Named after the 1920 
Treaty governing the partition of the Ottoman Empire’s core 
territory after its defeat and occupation in WWI, the Syndrome 
assumes that the country is being encroached upon by hostile 
powers benefiting from the support of “fifth columns” within 
the country itself – i.e. ethnic and religious minorities. The pe-
culiarly close relations between external and internal threats, 
the perception of the latter as being an extension of the former, 
adds a human geography dimension to the perception of border 
porosity already introduced in physical and diplomatic terms. 
In a multiethnic and multi-faith country like Turkey, this con-
ception contributed to creating a vicious circle between domes-
tic and external security policies9 and to the securitisation of 
national identity, traditionally seen by the Kemalist-Republican 
7 P. Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of  Trouble, London, Sage, 1996, pp. 27-35.
8 D. Jung, The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies, Chapel 
Hill, American Diplomacy Publisher, 2003.
9 The best incarnation of  this vicious circle is provided by the so called “two-
and-a-half  war strategy” put forward by the retired Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ 
in 1996, according to which Turkey should have been prepared to “conducting 
two full scale operations simultaneously along the Aegean and Southern fronts 
while at the same time being prepared for a “half  war” [with the PKK] that 
might be instigated from within the country”. S. Elekdağ, “2 ½ War Strategy”, 
Perceptions, no. 1, 1996, pp. 33-57.
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strategic paradigm as a barrier against centrifugal forces ben-
efiting from outside support. A similar pattern is discernible 
in Russia’s experience as a “multinational state whose imperial 
history has produced a fragile, fragmented national identity”10, 
endangered by an analogous threat of transnationalism11.
The Turkish and Russian insecurity complex was anything 
but defused by the end of the Cold War. Turkey, in particu-
lar, seemed not to benefit from the peace dividends that the 
easing in international tensions ensured to its Atlantic allies. 
On the contrary, the country found itself at the very centre of 
one of the main post-bipolar hotspots, in a “pentagon” of insta-
bility and uncertainty whose corners extended to the Balkans, 
the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, and the Black Sea basin12. Moreover the prolifera-
tion of threats along Turkish borders was aggravated, in turn, by 
the aforesaid risk of marginalisation from the Western security 
arrangements as well as by the resurgence of the external-inter-
nal security short-circuit as a consequence of the Kurdish drive 
towards gaining autonomy in Northern Iraq following the Gulf 
War. As for Russia, the emergence of conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space, along with the absence of Russian-led security arrange-
ments in the neighbourhood, generated instead a fundamental 
new challenge, i.e. the possibility that the security void left by 
USSR’s dissolution might end up being filled by hostile powers. 
Therefore, the risk of demotion at the global level and the insta-
bility at Russia’s borders concurred in reinvigorating Moscow’s 
traditional insecurity complex.
10 R. Suny, “Living in the Hood: Russia, Empire, and Old and New Neighbors”, 
in R. Legvold (2007), p. 36.
11 It is worth noting that the phenomenon of  transnationalism and the shared 
perception of  threat associated with it contributed to exacerbating tensions in 
bilateral relations through the 1990s, as a result of  reciprocal accusations of  sup-
porting the Kurdish and the Chechen insurgencies and terrorism.
12 This was the perception of  the Gen. Nezihi Çakar, Secretary General of  
the Turkey’s National Security Council between 1990 and 1992. See, N. Çakar, 
“Turkey’s Security Challenges”, Perceptions, vol. 1, no. 2, 1996.
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The countries’ insecurity complex – coupled with their “sta-
tus-seeking” apprehension – was primarily responsible for the 
conflicting trends in Turkey-Russia relations over the first dec-
ade of post-bipolar transition. Here, consistent with a trend in-
scribed in regional history13, the defensive actions undertaken 
by Turkey and Russia in order to defuse their respective inse-
curity complexes concurred in generating a power competition 
between Ankara and Moscow – progressively acquiring a piv-
otal role for opposed axes of multi-regional alliances14. In par-
ticular, Turkish-Russian relations were naturally strained as a 
consequence of Ankara’s attempt to defuse the risks of strategic 
marginalisation through revitalisation of its partnership with 
Atlantic allies, primarily with the United States. Consistent 
with a bandwagoning attitude, Turkey acted as a strategic and 
geographic bridgehead for US regional projection towards the 
post-Soviet and Middle Eastern area, subscribing to a neo-con-
tainment logic, which ineluctably put Ankara and Moscow on 
a collision course. Thus, recalling the alliance politics’ theory15 
it might be said that while Turkey’s strengthened commitment 
to the alliance with the US helped defuse the perceived risk 
of abandonment, at the same time it led to the opposite risk 
of entrapment while fostering an insecurity spiral with Russia, 
which, in turn, aggravated both actors’ perceptions of threat 
and sense of encirclement. The resulting need to defuse the po-
larisation trends and to find a more even balance between the 
global and regional dimensions of respective foreign policy was 
the first factor paving the way for the search for engagement in 
Turkish-Russian relations.
Another traditional pattern inherited from the imperial ex-
perience and similar in Turkey and Russia’s strategic culture is 
their adherence to the balance of power principle, as the soundest 
13 R. Legvold, “Introduction”, in R. Legvold (2007), p. 18.
14 P. Robins (2003), pp. 165-172.
15 G. Snyder, “The security dilemma in alliance politics”, World Politics, no. 36, 
1984, pp. 461-495.
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guarantee of systemic stability and national interest, and their 
upholding of the status quo as an indirect yet indispensable 
form of safeguarding status and security. Such behavioural pat-
terns historically emerged – especially in the case of Turkey16 
– in times of strategic retreat and diminishing power and there-
fore, mutatis mutandis, revived along the same rationales in the 
difficult post-bipolar environment17. Indeed, the inscrutable 
and mercurial nature of this environment, coupled with dimin-
ishing power resources and with the demotion-marginalisation 
risk, relegated Russia and Turkey to a position of “status quo 
power unable to maintain the status quo”18, i.e. with the con-
tradicting need to oppose revisionist tendencies in a rapidly 
changing environment that instead required pro-active policies.
The common resolve to safeguard the status quo against re-
visionist tendencies was a determinant factor around which 
Ankara and Moscow’s interests began to converge at the turn of 
the century. Such a convergence resulted primarily from simi-
lar reactions to the sharper US unilateralist and interventionist 
position following 9/11 and from a shared perception of risk 
associated with the two pillars sustaining the Bush Doctrine – 
i.e. the preventive war and the democracy promotion principles19. 
16 A. Karaosmanoğlu (2000), pp. 201-202. 
17 While Turkey’s traditional status quo attitude goes undiscussed in literature, 
quite different is the case for Russia, especially in the aftermath of  the Ukrainian 
crisis. For a rep-up of  the debate, see: A. Sergunin (2016),  pp. 27-37. 
18 The expression, originally proposed for Russia, seems to fit Turkey too, see 
G. Herd, “The ‘Battle of  Ideas, Concepts, and Geopolitical Projects’ in Central 
Asia, Implications for Russo-Chinese Relations?”, in R. Piet and R. Kanet 
(Eds.), Shifting Priorities in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy, Ashgate, Farnham and 
Burlington, 2016, p. 197.
19 The common opposition to the preventive war pillar clearly emerged in the shared 
dissent towards the Iraqi Freedom Operation (2003) as well as towards the pos-
sibility of  military interventions in the Middle East. The perception of  possible 
destabilisation associated with democracy promotion emerged primarily in the diffi-
dence shown towards the “Color revolutions” in Ukraine (2003), Georgia (2004) 
and Kyrgyzstan (2005).
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Far from being the mere result of exogenous factors, the pro-
gressive convergence in interests and perspectives was also the 
consequence of the maturation of the domestic identity debate. 
The progressive weakening of Westerners’ positions – i.e. of the 
Kemalists-Republicans, on the one hand, and of the European-
Atlanticist school of thought, on the other – paved the way for 
the redefinition of the nexus between identity and foreign pol-
icy in the muted post-bipolar environment, based on both ob-
jective and subjective elements. From the first perspective, the 
multiform and cyclic identity, institutional and economic crises 
affecting the West and the simultaneous rise of China presided 
over an eastward shift of international politics’ centre of gravity, 
ensuring a renovated centrality to both Turkey and Russia in 
the Eurasian landmass and, by extension, in the internation-
al system. Moreover, the objective elements substantiating this 
view were intertwined with and enhanced by subjective ones, 
resulting from the shared perception of being “refused” by the 
West – not only in strategic but also in civilisational terms20 – 
which, in turn, facilitated the reassessment of national identity 
contours through the valorisation of the countries’ specificities 
and distinctiveness. Therefore, the sense of centrality progres-
sively characterising both Turkey and Russia’s self-perception 
should not be understood in merely physical terms, but also in 
cultural and civilisational ones. Consistently, Russian “unique-
ness” came to be interpreted as the single factor justifying its 
natural multi-regional projection as well as its “indispensabili-
ty” and natural droit de regard in the same scenarios21. An analo-
gous causal relationship between the country’s geographic, stra-
tegic, and cultural uniqueness and a resulting “right and duty of 
involvement” in regional affairs also underlies the foreign policy 
conceptions emerging in Turkey at the turn of the century – as 
20 Y. Bozdağlioğlu, Turkish foreign policy and Turkish identity: a constructivist approach, 
New York and London, Taylor & Francis, 2005, pp. 79-85.
21 The relation between Russia’s uniqueness and indispensability is particularly 
strong in the case of  the Eurasianist school of  thought. See B. Lo (2002), pp. 
18-19. As for the notion of  indispensability, see also pp. 53-55.
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theorised by Ismail Cem’s “Positive Steps Diplomacy” doctrine 
and, successively, by Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “Strategic Depth” con-
cept22. As a matter of fact, the basic and common assumptions 
of both these doctrines was Turkey’s shift from the periphery to 
the core of the international system, i.e. from being a “European 
outpost” or a “wing country” in the bipolar system to becoming 
a “nevralgic centre” or a “central country” in the post-bipolar23.
From competition to cooperation: the “double 
compartmentalisation logic”
Building upon the convergence in interests and geopolitical 
perceptions, since the turn of the century the Turkish-Russian 
entente has been founded upon the “double compartmentali-
sation” of bilateral relations. Such a logic entailed, on the one 
hand, the separation between economic and political-diplo-
matic relations and, on the other, a tendency to marginalise 
those political-diplomatic issues which might trigger renewed 
competition, focusing instead on cooperation in the regional 
scenarios and issues manifesting convergence of interests. As 
such, the double compartmentalisation logic allowed Ankara 
and Moscow to insulate tactical convergences from persistent 
strategic divergences, effectively capitalising on the former 
while avoiding being affected by the potentially negative reper-
cussions of the latter.
The first dimension of the compartmentalisation logic has 
been consistent with a trend toward the economisation of 
22 I. Cem, Turkey in the New Century: Speeches and Texts. Presented at International Fora 
(1995-2001), Lefkoşa, Rustem, 2001, pp. 42-44; A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: 
Turkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, Kure Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2001; “Türkiye Merkez 
Ülke Olmalı”, Radikal Gazetesi, 26 February 2004.
23 As for the relation between Turkey’s rediscovered centrality and its responsibil-
ity in the neighbourhood see Ş. Kardaş, From Zero Problems to Leading the Change: 
Making Sense of  Transformation in Turkey’s Regional Policy, TEPAV, Turkey Policy 
Brief  Series, no. 5, 2012. 
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Ankara’s and Moscow’s external relations, which emerged at the 
turn of the century as the main adjustment to flawed foreign 
policy-setting excessively focused on geopolitical and hard-se-
curity considerations. In both cases, however, the economi-
sation of foreign policy did not account for a reversal of the 
traditional “security-first” approach to international relations. 
Instead it represented a different tactical means to achieve the 
same traditional strategic aim of improved security and sound-
er balance of power. In particular, for both Russia and Turkey 
their economic growth came to be interpreted as a prerequisite 
for carrying out independent foreign policy, which in turn rep-
resents a key factor for the enhancement of state power at the 
regional and international levels. It is not by chance that in 
both Turkey and Russia the renewed emphasis placed on the 
economic dimension of foreign policy was not sustained and 
compounded by a parallel process of domestic liberalisation, 
based first of all on the relinquishing of state control over key 
national economic assets. Quite on the contrary, the verticali-
sation of state management – maintained in Turkey and accen-
tuated in Russia – allowed for a more efficient use of national 
companies in the pursuit of traditional foreign policy goals.  
Consistent with the above-outlined trend, the economi-
sation of international and regional relations stemmed from 
Moscow’s attempt to ensure greater tactical coherence for its 
foreign policy tools, “substituting economic for cruder military 
instruments”24. Thus, besides reinforcing a renewed social pact 
based upon the promise of increased and enlarged well-being, 
economic growth was not an end in itself but a course followed 
“for the sake of power, autonomy, and global position”25. In 
the same tactical vein, the emphasis Ankara put on promoting 
economic interdependence with regional partners was coherent 
with the attempt to protect Turkey from the unavoidable and 
24 R. Legvold (2007), p. 7.
25 C. Wallander, Global Challenges and Russian Foreign Policy, in R. Legvold (2007), 
p. 458.
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cyclic instability in the neighbourhood, enhancing and sup-
porting the logic of “zero problems with neighbours” theorised 
by Davutoğlu26. 
In bilateral relations, the isolation of the economic agenda 
from the political allowed the partners to achieve a number of 
significant results, which contribute to better outline the state 
and the prospects of the relationship itself. First and foremost, 
compartmentalisation allowed the partnership to expand to tra-
ditionally politicised economic sectors, where cooperation was 
previously hindered by broader strategic considerations as well 
as by restrictions imposed by the logic of international align-
ments. The primary reference goes to the energy sector – which 
currently absorbs the larger share of bilateral trade – and, more 
specifically, to the strategic natural gas sector27.
The 1997 bilateral agreements by virtue of which Russia 
committed to supply Turkey with a volume of 6 billion cu-
bic meters per year over a 25-year period as well as to build a 
dedicated infrastructure through the Black Sea – the so called 
Blue Stream – represented the first rupture of that Russia-
containment policy around which Ankara and Washington had 
reinvigorated their bilateral partnership in the post-bipolar era. 
Indeed, by guaranteeing the long-term supply of one of the 
most promising regional gas markets, the Turkey-Russia agree-
ment subtracted feasibility margins from the rival East-West 
Energy Corridor between Central Asia and Europe, promoted 
and supported by the United States with a view to enhancing 
26 See, e.g., A. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy”, Foreign 
Policy, 20 May 2010. 
27 Unlike oil, natural gas has a transport process that is “rigid” by definition and 
which hinders the formation of  a global market. This means that – despite the 
growth of  spot markets – gas exchanges are still largely based on bilateral con-
tracts that bind buyers and sellers in the long term. Therefore, the rigidity of  the 
market obliges both exporter and consumer countries to apply a more strategic 
and far-sighted planning, which is not confined to the economic sphere but re-
quires a wider political entente between the parties as well as a greater role for 
so-called energy diplomacy. 
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the sovereignty and independence of the post-Soviet producer 
and transit states along the aforesaid route28. 
More than other economic sectors, energy embodies the es-
sence of the functional interdependence between the two part-
ners, in term of relations between a supplier and a consumer 
country as well as between an exporting and a potential transit 
country. First and foremost, for Turkey Russia represents an 
indispensable and reliable energy supplier – traditionally and 
by far the largest supplier of natural gas and one of the most 
important suppliers of oil – whose cooperation is essential in 
satisfying domestic demand for primary energy29. Conversely, 
at a time when traditional gas commercialisation schemes are 
increasingly challenged by significant innovations in extractive 
techniques as well as in marketing technologies and methods – 
i.e. by shale gas potential, by the growth in LNG supply and by 
spot markets – Turkey for Russia represents a strategic market 
in terms of both current and prospective demand for natural 
gas30. Moreover, no less significant is this bilateral cooperation 
in relation to respective long-term energy and infrastructural 
strategies. From this perspective, for Ankara the Russian gas 
28 C. Frappi, “The Caspian Sea Basin in United States Strategic Thinking and 
Policies”, in C. Frappi and A. Garibov (Eds.), The Caspian Sea chessboard: Geo-
political, Geo-strategic and Geo-economic Analysis, Milan, Egea, 2014, pp.181-202.
29 In 2015 Russian oil and gas accounted respectively for 12.4% and 55.3% of  
total annual imports. Meaningfully, the volume of  gas exported in 2016 was only 
slightly inferior (1.84 billion cubic meters/bcm) to the 2015 volume (26.6 bcm), 
despite the bilateral crisis in the first half  of  the year and reciprocal threats of  
interruption, see BP, BP Statistical Review of  World Energy, June 2016.
30 With a volume of  gas imports from Russia of  24.76 bcm in 2016 (on a to-
tal consumption of  42,1 bcm), Turkey represents the second final market for 
Gazprom exports, behind Germany (29.2 bcm in 2016). Moreover, notwith-
standing a contraction trend in Turkish annual gas demand, current indepen-
dent estimates in gas demand growth indicate that by 2025 the demand latter 
is expected grow up to 55-56 (bcm) a year by 2025 and to 60-62 bcm/year by 
2030. See, G. Rzayeva, “Turkey’s gas demand decline: reasons and consequenc-
es”, Energy Insight, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, no. 11, 2017.
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supply channel represents a key resource for advancing a tra-
ditional and central aim of its energy policy, i.e. the resolve to 
take advantage of the strategic location of the country, situated 
between Eurasia’s main energy producing and consuming areas, 
in order to promote a regional hub role. That is, by maximising 
supply channels and import volumes, Turkey may re-export the 
surplus, thereby reducing the elevated costs associated with im-
port dependency and simultaneously raising its own strategic 
significance to both regional producer and consumer countries. 
Vice-versa, from Moscow’s perspective Turkey stands as a vi-
tal bridgehead to the Southern European gas markets, at the 
same time bypassing transit through Ukrainian territory and 
the tightening EU energy normative. On this backdrop, the en-
ergy interests and strategies of Turkey and Russia were welded 
together by the fall 2014 agreement aimed at the construction, 
along the Black Sea route, of the off-shore Turkish Stream gas 
pipeline, on the ashes of the scrapped South Stream project.
Besides contributing to the remarkable increase in annual 
economic turnover31, the enhancement of their economic inter-
dependence allowed the partners to both expand and consoli-
date the bases of bilateral relations. In fact, the increased level 
of bilateral turnover led to a broadening of economic ties and 
interactions beyond the major state-owned enterprises – in 
primis the national energy companies –, thus widening and 
deepening the synergies between the countries’ entrepreneurial 
and productive sectors. Facilitated also by the decision to adopt 
a visa-free travel regime, this trend in turn presided over  the 
enlargement of those national stakeholders concerned with the 
maintenance of good bilateral relations, thereby providing the 
partnership with enhanced solidity and with a higher degree of 
sustainability over time.
31 The level of  bilateral grew trade from US$2.9 billion in 1999 to a peak of  31.2 
billion in 2014. In 2015 and 2016 the bilateral trade stood respectively at 23.9 and 
16.9 billion. Turkish Statistical Institute, Foreign Trade Statistics Database.
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Last but not least, the enhancement of economic and trade 
relations facilitated and strengthened the entente at the politi-
cal and diplomatic levels32, along the second dimension of the 
partnership’s compartmentalisation logic – i.e. the isolation 
of contentious regional issues from the ones benefiting from 
sounder convergence in interests. The political-diplomatic en-
tente developed consistently with the above-mentioned adjust-
ments in the perceived civilisational location and systemic role 
of Turkey and Russia in the post-bipolar environment. 
In the Turkish and Russian views, the rediscovery and reaf-
firmation of the countries’ geographic, historical and cultural 
uniqueness naturally endowed them with the primary responsi-
bility to ensure and guarantee peace and stability in neighbour-
ing areas. Therefore, the bond welding Ankara and Moscow’s 
policies in their shared neighbourhood came to be the joint 
proposition of a “regional ownership” principle, whereby coun-
tries belonging to the same area are called upon – borrowing 
words from then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu – “to find re-
gional solutions to their regional problems, rather than waiting 
for other actors from outside the region to impose their own 
solutions”33. As said, the degree of defection from the alliance 
with the United States embodied in Davutoğlu’s wording and 
in consistent Turkish regional projection opened up room for 
cooperation with Moscow in a multi-regional direction. As 
a consequence, albeit to a different degree of depth and with 
different results, the regional ownership logic guided bilateral 
cooperation and initiatives in the shared neighbourhood, i.e. 
from the Black Sea area to the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Nowhere has the joint proposition of the regional owner-
ship principle been more successful than in the Black Sea ba-
sin, which during the first decade of the century emerged as 
32 For a coeval analysis, see D. Sezer, “The Challenges of  Reconciling Geopolitical 
Competition with Economic Partnership”, Turkish Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 2000, pp. 
59-82.  
33 Interview by Ahmet Davutoğlu published in AUC Cairo Review, 12 March 2012.
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the main flash point between the enlarged Euro-Atlantic in-
stitutions and the area traditionally perceived by Moscow as 
its own natural sphere of interests. Here, starting from 2001, 
Turkey and Russia developed sound mechanisms for naval co-
operation, which enabled Ankara to join Moscow in resisting 
US pressure to extend to the basin the NATO naval anti-terror 
operations conducted in the Mediterranean under Operation 
Active Endeavor34. 
The results of joint cooperation and stabilisation initiatives 
were instead somehow muted in the Southern Caucasus where 
notwithstanding different – and to a great extent opposite – 
stances over the systematisation of the area and over the princi-
ples for resolving protracted sub-regional conflicts, Ankara and 
Moscow seemed to be keen to develop joint initiatives. This 
was particularly the case in the aftermath of the 2008 Russian-
Georgian war over South Ossetia when Ankara’s resolve to put 
forward “regional solutions to regional problems” resulted in 
the autonomous proposal of an initiative aimed at involving 
Russia and local actors in “Calming the Caucasus”35. The main 
achievement of Turkey’s initiative was to keep open a bilateral 
channel for dialogue in times of crisis, while avoiding entrap-
ping the country in a spiral of sub-regional polarisations with 
Russia. However, in spite of Moscow’s declaratory stances, it 
failed to involve Turkey in concrete and shared joint measures 
34 In April 2001 the Black Sea littoral states created the Black Sea Naval 
Cooperation Task Group (Blackseafor), a naval cooperation mechanism entrust-
ed, since 2004, also with prerogatives in the field of  anti-terrorism and for the 
control of  trafficking in weapons of  mass destruction. Turco-Russian strategic 
cooperation in the basin was further widened in December 2006 by virtue of  
Russia’s association to the Black Sea Harmony operation, launched by Ankara in 
2004 for the control of  vessels transiting the Sea. These prerogatives – and spe-
cifically the will to not duplicate the existing mechanisms – represented the main 
justification for rejecting the US proposal to extend to the Black Sea the NATO’s 
anti-terrorist operations (Active Endeavor) conducted in the Mediterranean 
since 2001.
35 A. Babacan, “Calming the Caucasus”, The New York Times, 23 September 2008.
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for stabilisation – i.e. in the proposal of a region-wide stabili-
sation platform and in the relaunch of negotiations over the 
protracted conflicts.
The muted results of the attempt to extend the regional 
ownership logic to the Caucasus area reveal two essential traits 
of the bilateral entente. First and foremost they exposed the 
asymmetrical nature of the bilateral relation between Russia 
as a great power and Turkey as a middle power, even beyond 
economic considerations based on the latter’s energy depend-
ency36. Russia’s unwillingness to give up its sub-regional hegem-
onic role for the sake of stabilisation shows Moscow’s rational 
resolve to retain its power resources as well as the gap in bar-
gaining power between the partners. Secondly, when compared 
to the achievements of bilateral cooperation in the Black Sea 
area, the shortcomings in the Caucasus demonstrate the lack of 
a shared strategic vision between the partners and the eminent-
ly tactical nature of the entente. For Russia, the Turkey entente 
falls primarily within the attempt to balance the United States 
by means of so-called network diplomacy – that is, a web of 
flexible and tactical regional and sub-regional alignments al-
lowing Moscow to pursue this balancing in different scenarios 
in cooperation with pivotal local partners. Therefore, in those 
areas where Moscow may perform an internal balancing act or, 
rather, may act in cooperation with different partners, the scope 
of Turkish-Russian cooperation is naturally narrower. 
The fallacy of the compartmentalisation logic: 
the Middle Eastern lessons 
The pillar upon which the Turkish-Russian embrace is built – 
i.e. the double compartmentation logic – embodies both the 
contingent strength of the cooperation axis and the deepest 
36 See, for instance, Z. Öniş and Ş. Yılmaz, “Turkey and Russia in a shifting global 
order: cooperation, conflict and asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent re-
gion”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1, 2016, pp. 71-95.
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reasons for its structural weakness. That is, while it allowed for a 
rapprochement otherwise difficult to achieve, at the same time, 
by advocating tactical alignments in the absence of a broader 
and shared strategic vision, it keeps open the possibility for re-
newed spirals of crisis and confrontation. Simultaneously, the 
compartmentalisation logic remains vulnerable to the possibil-
ity that marginalised regional issues may unintentionally raise 
the stakes, fostering conflicting reactions and endangering the 
whole spectrum of the bilateral cooperation.
The latter was precisely the case of the Middle Eastern sce-
nario, which, before the wave of the so-called Arab Spring, was 
relegated to the margins of Turkish-Russian cooperation, not-
withstanding the shared intent to abide by the general prin-
ciples guiding the entente – i.e. the resolve to safeguard the 
status quo by avoiding the diplomatic isolation of local actors as 
well as by opposing foreign interventions potentially disrupting 
regional stability. However, the course of the regional events – 
and, particularly, the protracted conflict in Syria – progressive-
ly raised Turkish and Russian stakes in the scenario, exposing 
conflicting views and interests regarding the area’s stabilisation 
and entangling the partners in opposite camps of regional eth-
nic and sectarian polarisation. This was chiefly the result of 
Turkey’s attempt to capitalise on the wave of unrest, maxim-
ising a decade of improved soft power in order to advance a 
regional leadership role. Facing the unprecedented dilemma of 
taking sides either with the insurgent populations or with the 
local regimes37, Ankara opted for the former by subscribing to 
a regime change agenda which took Turkey to the forefront of 
the heterogeneous “revisionist camp”, including both Western 
and Sunni powers. In doing so, Ankara not only ended up 
37 On the eve of  regional upheaval, then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu efficacious-
ly recapped the dilemma by portraying Turkey as being “entrapped between […] 
two successes” – i.e. good relations with Middle Eastern governments and grow-
ing popularity among populations – and, thus, between two opposite expecta-
tions. See B. Yinanç, “Turkish FM says US, NATO support Ankara’s roap map 
for Libya”, Hürriyet Daily News, 7 May 2011.
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by reinvigorating its own insecurity complex, but also openly 
contradicted the original rationale of the bilateral entente with 
Russia, thus clashing with Moscow’s opposite resolve to keep 
the status quo unaffected and, simultaneously, to enhance its 
regional alignments along the Damascus-Baghdad-Tehran axis. 
Over and above the immediate causes and the course of the 
bilateral crisis – from the downing of a Russian bomber by 
Turkish forces in November 2015 to Erdoğan’s letter mending 
the relation’s fences in June 2016 – the crisis contributes to 
portraying both the fallacies and the resilience inscribed in the 
partnership as well as in the logic presiding over it. 
First and foremost, the crisis in the Middle East demonstrat-
ed that a renewed spiral of confrontation in one of the regional 
scenarios where Turkey and Russia concurrently project their 
influence might have a domino effect on cooperation in other 
scenarios, rapidly enlarging the scope and the depth of the crisis 
itself. Over the crisis’ seven-month duration, this was particu-
larly the case with Turkey’s threat of disalignment in the Black 
Sea area. Here the threat took the shape of a renewed tilting 
toward naval cooperation with NATO38, contrasting with the 
bilateral cooperation’s achievements in the basin. Moreover, 
it took the shape of an enhancement of the partnership with 
Ukraine and a hardening of the tones  condemning Russia’s il-
legitimate takeover of Crimea39, contradicting the balanced po-
sition held by Ankara since the eruption of the Ukrainian crisis. 
Nor did the retaliation spiral leave unaffected the core element 
of the partnership, i.e. the economic and energy dimension. 
Indeed, besides adopting economic sanctions against Turkey, 
Moscow scrapped the preliminary agreement for realisation of 
the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, thus leveraging its main source 
of bargaining power vis-à-vis its partner. Moreover, exacerbating 
one of the main security threats posed to Turkey by the Syrian 
38 J. Kucera, “Erdoğan, In Plea To NATO, Says Black Sea Has Become ‘Russian 
Lake’”, Eurasianet, 11 May 2016.
39 “Turkey and Ukraine Forge an Unlikely Alliance”, Stratfor, 14 March 2016.
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conflict, the Kremlin openly revived its traditional patronage 
relationship with the Kurdish population40 – whose breach, at 
the end of the 1990s, had been one of the main factors facilitat-
ing the bilateral rapprochement. 
The retaliation spiral has had another important impact on 
the partnership. While not necessarily demonstrating the ineluc-
tability of conflicting relations between Ankara and Moscow41, 
nonetheless it reactivated a traditional sense of reciprocal dif-
fidence between the parties deeply rooted in both history and 
their respective insecurity complexes. Exposing the risks associ-
ated with renewed phases of competition between the partners, 
such a perception was not entirely dissipated by the normali-
sation of relations after June 2016. That is, the normalisation 
process did not bring about a parallel and wider reconciliation 
process, still largely unfulfilled42. Moreover, the harsh rhetoric 
employed by both country’s leadership during the crisis, fueling 
both societies’ growing nationalistic sentiments, ended up by 
creating societal resistances to the reconciliation process. This 
trend risks, on the one hand, weakening the enlargement of 
societal stakeholders achieved through the improvement of eco-
nomic interactions while, on the other, potentially leaving the 
countries more prone to renewed spirals of crisis than they were 
before November 2015. 
The way the crisis was defused and bilateral cooperation 
relaunched is equally telling in portraying the current status 
and the perspectives of the Russian-Turkish entente. Firstly, 
40 M. Reynolds, “Vladimir Putin, Godfather of  Kurdistan?”, The National Interest, 
1 March 2016.
41 For a contrasting view, see J. Mankoff, “Why Russia and Turkey Fight. A 
History of  Antagonism”, Foreign Affairs, 24 February 2016.
42 An indirect yet significant element showing both the incompletion of  the nor-
malisation process at the intergovernmental level as well as the depth of  recip-
rocal diffidence is the Kremlin’s decision not to withdraw – at the time of  writ-
ing – all the economic sanctions adopted against Turkey during the crisis. The 
Kremlin’s position was reciprocated, in March, by Turkey through the decision 
to freeze the issuance of  licenses for duty-free grain imports from the country.
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Erdoğan’s letter of condolence and apology sent to Russian 
counterpart Putin, exposing Turkey’s inability to bear the eco-
nomic and political costs of the confrontation – especially at a 
time of growing diplomatic isolation, reigniting of the domes-
tic-external Kurdish threat perception, and looming economic 
crisis – proved once more the asymmetrical nature of the part-
nership and the gap in respective sources of power and leverage.
Looking ex post at the crisis’ course, it is worth noting that, 
notwithstanding the reciprocal threats to retaliate by down-
grading energy cooperation – i.e. cutting gas supply or rather 
reducing its purchase – Russia’s supply to Turkey went largely 
unaffected, clearly demonstrating the primary weight of the 
sector in supporting and enhancing the resilience of the bilater-
al partnership. It is not by chance that the revitalisation of the 
Turkish Stream pipeline project and acceleration of the norma-
tive process leading to its realisation emerged as a priority and 
privileged ground for diplomatic normalisation. Moreover, the 
normalisation process itself is equally telling in confirming the 
traditional partnership priorities for action as well as the logic 
behind it. Indeed, over and above the revitalisation of energy 
partnership and the inauguration of a significant cooperation 
course in the defense sector43, the normalisation process has 
been chiefly based upon the reaffirmation and the spatial wid-
ening of the regional ownership principle. From the first perspec-
tive, the renewal of cooperation plans in the Black Sea basin, 
along with the resumption of the still-limited-in-scope dialogue 
43 In September 2017 Turkey and Russia signed a controversial €2.14 billions 
deal for the purchase of  Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles. The deal, finalised 
in December, is particularly significant as far as Ankara-Moscow bilateral rela-
tions and Turkey participation in Atlantic Alliance are concerned. Indeed, the 
deal stands as the biggest purchase of  Russian arms made not only by Turkey 
(whose purchase from Russia between 1992 and 2016 reached a total of  US$201 
millions) but, generally speaking, from a NATO member country. Moreover, 
the S-400 anti-aircraft system cannot be integrated into NATO’s own military 
apparatus, including the one deployed in Turkey itself.
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on the pacification of the Southern Caucasus44, confirm the pri-
oritisation of the shared neighbourhood for the joint pursuit of 
regional ownership. Furthermore, the latter was also extended 
to the Middle Eastern area and widened through the inclusion 
of Iran, as epitomised by the so-called Astana Process. While 
for Turkey such widening seems to be consistent with a wid-
er process aimed at re-ensuring coherence with (and mending 
the fences of ) its Middle Eastern policy by defusing the risks 
associated with the regional polarisation spiral, for Russia it 
represents the enhancing of its network diplomacy in an envi-
ronment critically important for the multi-regional balancing of 
the United States. Notwithstanding the mutual benefits of the 
revived entente, the pivotal role played by Moscow in the un-
folding trilateral dialogue and cooperation once again testifies 
to the widening gap in Russia and Turkey’s power and leverage 
resources, i.e. the enhanced asymmetry in their bilateral part-
nership – simultaneously exposed also by Moscow’s key role in 
helping or allowing Ankara to defuse the increasing Kurdish 
threat coming from its Southern border.
Conclusion
The parallel and intertwined processes of searching for identity 
and role in the post-bipolar era opened up room for tactical 
entente and cooperation between Turkey and Russia, along 
a double compartmentalisation logic. While allowing for a 
pragmatic rapprochement otherwise difficult to achieve, such 
a logic epitomises the inherent weaknesses of the partnership, 
on two basic levels. Firstly, as exposed by the 2015-2016 crisis 
over Syria, regional issues marginalised by the relation may un-
intendedly rupture the compartmentalisation borders and en-
danger the whole course of bilateral partnership. Secondly, the 
44 See respectively M. Gurcan, “Is Turkey turning its stern on the West in the 
Black Sea?”, Al-Monitor, 15 December 2016; “FM: Turkey, Russia work jointly to 
settle Karabakh conflict”, Today.Az, 22 March 2017.
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tactical nature of the entente leaves constant room for the clash 
of wider strategic interests and policies. Inter alia, this means 
that renewed spirals of crisis and confrontation may materialise 
not only where Turkish and Russian interests more openly col-
lide, but also in those regional scenarios where they apparently 
converge in safeguarding the status quo and, potentially, as a 
consequence of unwanted and beyond-their-control initiatives 
coming from third parties. This is, e.g., the risk emerging in 
a critical and polarised scenario like the Southern Caucasus, 
where there is no strategic convergence between the partners 
over the perspective for long-term systematisation and where 
the patronage logic puts them on opposite sides of potential 
sub-regional conflicts. At the same time, the tendency to tacti-
cally align regional policies in the absence of a common strate-
gic vision – like in the current Syrian scenario – naturally leaves 
room for a renewed spiral of competition and confrontation.
The recent crisis in relations, while exposing a widening power 
asymmetry between the partners, has nonetheless confirmed the 
high degree of resilience of the entente, which still represents an 
important vector for both partners’ foreign policy. While Turkey 
still represents a key interlocutor in advancing Moscow’s own 
view of a multilateral international system, Russia is for Ankara 
a valuable partner in pursuing its traditional securitisation goals 
as well as in striking a coherent balance between its regional 
and global alignments. From this perspective, the old Ottoman 
tendency to protect the state’s interest by playing great powers’ 
policies against one another seems to fit well the current policy 
of middle-power Turkey, thus making relations with Russia as 
important as ever – the more so as a consequence of the bad 
state of relations between Ankara and its Western interlocutors 
on both the shores of the Atlantic Ocean.
When analysing the logic behind the Turkish-Russian part-
nership it would be unwise not to look beyond the mere tacti-
cal convergences of respective interests. Indeed, since its incep-
tion the rapprochement stemmed chiefly from the challenging 
and still largely unfulfilled process of adapting to the changing 
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parameters of the international post-bipolar system, in both stra-
tegic and identity terms. From the former perspective, the en-
tente was the result of adaptation to the regionalisation process 
of the international system, which, in comparison to the Cold 
War environment, has been witnessing a hierarchical overturn-
ing between global and regional dynamics, much to the benefit 
of the latter. From the second and closely connected point of 
view, the rapprochement resulted from the maturing domestic 
identity debate, around a shared downgrading of the Western-
European component of their respective syncretic identities 
and a simultaneous valorisation of their civilisational unique-
ness. Welding together the double transition trends, Turkey and 
Russia have been advancing and claiming a new centrality in 
the current international system, consistently with a process of 
strategic-identity realignment which can hardly be interpreted 
as merely conjunctural and which seems to leave wide room 
for the improvement of bilateral relations in a multi-regional 
perspective.
The aforesaid consideration is also important in appraising 
the current state of Ankara and Moscow’s relations with the 
West. Indeed, Turkey and Russia’s strategic defection from the 
alliance and from cooperation with the West reflects a wider 
identity reassessment process, which, in both cases, signals the 
partial overcoming of a sense of backwardness and peripheral-
ity vis-à-vis Western civilisation, with deep roots in both his-
tory and strategic culture. Extending to Turkey what Bobo Lo 
wrote about Russia, it might be said that in both cases “gone 
is the desperation to be accepted in the European mainstream, 
and the inferiority complex that imbued this aim”45. The in-
tertwined strategic and identity reassessment processes natural-
ly entail a degree of competition with the West, in strategic, 
economic, and even normative terms. While not necessarily 
assuming conflicting traits, this trend seems to emerge as a 
45 B. Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder, London, Royal Institute of  International 
Affairs, p. 181.
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structural dynamic in Ankara and Moscow’s relations with their 
Euro-Atlantic interlocutors, demonstrating their shared inter-
ests in safeguarding the multi-regional status quo and resisting 
the West’s perceived revisionist tendencies and, at a wider look, 
an attempt to base post-bipolar roles and identity on the affir-
mation of a multi-regional pivotal or hegemonic role.
